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It is hard to have a southern overseer; it is worse to have a 
northern one; but worst of all when you are the slave-driver 
yourself. 
Henry David Thoreau, Walden; or, Life in 
the Woods ? 
Frederick Douglass's autobiographical descriptions of his experiences as a 
slave are often recalled when, in discussions of slavery, an optimistic emphasis 
is placed on the possibility of the subject's resistance to violent regimes of 
subjugation. In these discussions, the famous scene of the narrator's fight with 
the slave-breaker Edward Covey is taken as an example of how, by risking his 
life, the slave is capable of wresting his freedom and "manhood" from the 
seemingly overwhelming violence and oppression of slavery.2 However, in his 
autobiography, Richard Wright, writing exactly one hundred years after Douglass, 
illustrates how such manifestations of resistance have in turn elicited further, 
unexpected forms of subjection. In recasting Douglass's description of slave-
breaking and possible resistance thereto into the early-twentieth-century 
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American South, Wright points to the shifts of racial violence in American society. 
He shows how such forms of corporal violence as slave-breaking and lynching 
had by the 1920s been taken over by (or all but disappeared into) self-breaking, 
achieved through the injunctions of what I call, after Wright, the optical trade. 
Naming both an economy of the visible and an historical shift toward disembodied 
surveillance, the optical trade, as Wright demonstrates, organizes and sustains 
the racial logic of twentieth-century America.3 
We can conceptualize the differences between these two forms of subjection 
through two theoretical frameworks, namely Hegelian and Foucauldian. It is 
easy to understand why Hegel, especially as he has been mediated by Alexandre 
Kojève, would invite an optimistic reading of the futurity of slavery. In the 
second fight between the master and the bondsman, the slave, by risking his life 
and thereby establishing human desire, "dialectically overcomes" his slavery, 
and history reaches synthesis (Aufhebung).4 As Kojève writes, only the slave, 
through his experiences of mortal terror and work, is capable of true revolutionary 
action: 
this revolutionary transformation of the World presupposes 
the 'negation,' the non-accepting of the given World in its 
totality. And the origin of this absolute negation can only be 
the absolute dread inspired by the given World, or more 
precisely, by that which, or by him who, dominates this World, 
by the Master of this World.5 
The master, on the other hand, can be at best "a 'skillful' reformer, or better, a 
conformer."6 
For critics of the Hegelian bent, the fight in which the working slave 
overcomes the idle master is embodied in Douglass's challenge to Covey. The 
autobiographical narrator's uprising prefaces a "dialectical overcoming" of 
slavery and hence points towards "authentic freedom." Douglass thus proves to 
be a true "revolutionary." As Kojève argues, "the satisfied man will necessarily 
be a Slave; or more exactly, the man who has been a Slave, who has passed 
through Slavery, who has 'dialectically overcome' his slavery.... If idle Mastery 
is an impasse, laborious Slavery, in contrast, is the source of all human, social, 
historical progress. History is the history of the working Slave."7 Having 
overcome Covey the master, Douglass the slave is on his way to authentic self-
consciousness, which is possible only for the subject who has experienced 
Slavery. 
The Foucauldian/Wrightian reading of slavery's afterlife in post-
Reconstruction America, however, offers no such progressive comfort. Instead, 
Wright points to the panoptic regime's superior efficacy over the spectacle of 
punishment in ensuring subjection. In this economy, the kind of overcoming 
that Douglass embodies may indeed lead to another trap where slaves are enslaved 
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even more efficiently, not through their ruthless masters but through their own 
disciplinary gaze. Wright's recontextualization of slave-breaking thus arguably 
illustrates the by-now familiar Foucauldian thesis about the enfolding of external 
injunctions into an internalized code in modern power/knowledge regimes.8 
While the spectacles of overtly violent racism were partially disappearing by 
the time of Wright's narrative, forms of subjugation had simultaneously mutated 
into a more economically disseminated disciplinary regime, whose power rested 
on the violence of the visible. 
In a cautionary note about methodology, Richard Brodhead warns against 
recognizing in our readings of nineteenth- and twentieth-century North American 
culture the epistemic shifts of which Foucault speaks.9 Pointing out the dearth 
of references to the racialized logic of punishment in Foucault's work,10 Angela 
Y. Davis too encourages caution in translating his studies of incarceration onto 
the North American scene. Alerting us to the specificities of carcéral practices 
in post-bellum United States, where racial slavery, although abolished, profoundly 
affected the penal code, she reminds us that, whereas Foucault sees a shift from 
the body to the soul as the focus of European penal forms, "black slaves in the 
US were largely perceived as lacking the soul that might be shaped and 
transformed by punishment." Consequently, "the privilege of punishment"— 
based as it was on the assumption of the inherent liberty and equality of subjects 
that could then be rescinded—was applicable only to white subjects, and "the 
punishment of black slaves was corporal, concrete and particular."11 She further 
argues that abolition "corresponded to the authorization of slavery as 
punishment": "The incarceration of former slaves served not so much to affirm 
the rights and liberties of the freedmen and women (i.e. as rights and liberties of 
which they could be deprived), nor to discipline a potential labor force; rather it 
symbolically emphasized that black people's social status continued to be that 
of slaves, even though the institution of slavery had been disestablished."12 To 
show how "slavery's underlying philosophy of punishment insinuated itself into 
the history of imprisonment,"13 Davis further cites Matthew Mancini's argument 
that the practice of convict leasing disallows the direct mapping of the 
Foucauldian shift onto the U.S. terrain.14 
Brodhead insists that, while engaging in dialogues between theory and 
history, we should carefully heed "the interplay of forces specific to actual social 
sites."15 The primary way in which I hope to disenable the possible Procrustean 
violence of theoretical frameworks is by attending closely to Douglass's and 
Wright's literary works. However, while my focus here is on what these two 
African-American texts, a century apart, suggest about the shift in nineteenth-
and twentieth-century racial relations, a number of historical accounts of post-
Reconstruction America corroborate the optical trade that Foucault and Wright 
suggest to have taken place. Historians make clear that the violence Black Boy's 
adolescent narrator would have faced in the early 1920s was obviously different, 
but not necessarily lessened, from the brutality of slavery with which Douglass 
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had struggled. After the "grand but brief interlude of multiracial democratic 
experimentation"16 of Reconstruction, by the turn of the century a "stiff 
conformity and fanatical rigidity" had taken over Southern race relations.17 C. 
Vann Woodward mentions Wright's home state Mississippi as the "pioneer of 
the movement" for black disfranchisement18 and goes on to point out that 
segregation showed no signs of easing in the 1920s, the decade that Wright 
describes in the passages on which I concentrate in this essay. "In fact," he 
writes, "the Jim Crow laws were elaborated and further expanded in those 
years."19 The growth of Jim Crow was made possible by the shifts in the way the 
color line was policed. Tracing the NAACP's anti-lynching campaigns, Robert 
L. Zangrando notes that "[a]s opposition [to lynching] mounted in the 1920s 
and 1930s, the number of reported lynchings declined, but more subtle forms of 
brutality evolved."20 Zangrando points to how lynchings ceased to be widely-
advertised entertainment for large crowds and instead were carried out by smaller 
groups of assailants; how news about lynchings were more often suppressed 
than distributed to the media, as had been done in earlier decades; and how 
executions were sometimes sanctioned in mock trials preceding the violence.21 
I argue that Wright's autobiography, in describing self-breaking and the optical 
trade, suggests further ways in which racial violence became less tangible yet 
more effective in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
To further illustrate such shifts in racial subjection, I will follow how, for 
numerous African-American writers and thinkers of the nineteenth century, 
religious organization and activity—whose syncretic forms may have enabled 
slave survival22—participated in the optical trade and mutated into practices of 
subjection that ensured docility. Wright too points to this double effect: while 
he does at times offer a positive assessment of the function of religion and 
spirituality in African-American communities,23 he is better known for dismissing 
religion's emancipatory potential and emphasizing its role in the disciplinary 
network of subjection.24 In Black Boy, he describes the pupils in a religious 
school as "a docile lot," "claimed wholly by their environment" (100). In this, 
he echoes the ways many nineteenth-century African-American writers grappled 
with Christianity's ambivalent potential for both liberation theology and a 
renunciation of worldly resistance. 
If my analysis of Douglass and Wright yields a rather pessimistic reading 
of slavery's afterlife—where "slavery is dead but inescapable"25—I am not alone 
in noting such tendencies. Indeed, the problematic I point to has been catalogued 
in more depth and range by Saidiya V. Hartman in Scenes of Subjection.26 One 
may want to emphasize not only that the implication of resistance in the networks 
of power makes it impossible to foresee the effects of any counterstrategies, but 
also that the ubiquity of power renders all future mutations strictly 
unforeseeable.27 Given such unpredictability—what Ann Laura Stoler calls 
racism's "polyvalent mobility"28—one hopes that tracing past evolutions may 
encourage the kind of "pessimistic activity" to which Foucault refers in 
commenting on the political implications of his work.29 While the exploration 
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of what such unstable practices of resistance and self-making might mean remains 
beyond the scope of this article, I will point to an opening by very briefly noting 
the role of the experience of the literary—reading and writing—has for Wright's 
autobiographical narrator. 
From Slave-Breaking to Self-Breaking 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault famously traces the transitions that he 
claims shaped the penal system and the whole of Western societies during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He contends that "the gloomy festival of 
punishment" of the seventeenth century—characterized by an excess of violence, 
by the protracted torture of criminal(ized) bodies, and by the public display of 
the execution proceedings—was slowly superseded by a disciplinary practice 
where the "body as the major target of penal repression disappeared."30 Foucault 
argues that, in the latter form of punishment, disciplinary power "imposes on 
those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is 
the subjects who have to be seen" (187). He also stresses that the panoptic 
surveillance that finds its extreme form in the carcéral situation is by no means 
limited to prisons or other disciplinary institutions such as the army, the 
schoolroom, the orphanage, or the monastery.31 In these, one can observe in 
concentrated form the strategies of surveillance and discipline discernible in 
the society at large. As Gilles Deleuze points out, "discipline cannot be identified 
with any one institution or apparatus precisely because it is a type of power, a 
technology, that traverses every kind of apparatus or institution, linking them, 
prolonging them, and making them converge and function in a new way."32 
That slavery included practices that Foucault would name those of the 
spectacle is clear from Douglass's text. In a crucial, early scene in the Narrative, 
the young narrator describes the sight of a female relative being mercilessly 
beaten. 
No words, no tears, no prayers, from his gory victim, seemed 
to move [the master's] iron heart from its bloody purpose. 
The louder she screamed, the harder he whipped; and where 
the blood ran fastest, there he whipped longest. He would 
whip her to make her scream, and whip her to make her hush; 
and not until overcome by fatigue, would he cease to swing 
the blood-clotted cowskin. I remember the first time I ever 
witnessed this horrible exhibition. I was quite a child, but I 
well remember it. I never shall forget it whilst I remember 
any thing. It was the first of a long series of such outrages, of 
which I was doomed to be a witness and a participant. It struck 
me with awful force. It was the blood-stained gate, the entrance 
to the hell of slavery, through which I was about to pass. It 
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was the most terrible spectacle. I wish I could commit to paper 
the feelings with which I beheld it.33 
Even though the lashes do not land on his back, this "most terrible spectacle" 
"str[ikes]" the young spectator "with awful force"; even though he is not directly 
subjected to the beating, the scene he is forced to witness nevertheless ushers 
him through "the entrance to the hell of slavery." In other words, the violent, 
public scene of the punishment sutures the narrator into his "place" within the 
violent economy of slavery. 
Clearly, however, the spectacle of the punishment is supported by other 
strategies of subjugation—strategies which seem to correspond to the 
Foucauldian concept of disciplinary power. The most famous passages of "slave 
breaking" are those where Douglass describes his servitude under the "negro-
breaker" Edward Covey.34 Using deception to catch his slaves "neglecting" their 
duties of constant toil (and thus to justify consequent punishment), Covey 
surreptitiously watches over his servants: "His comings were like a thief in the 
night. He appeared to us as being ever at hand. He was under every tree, behind 
every stump, in every bush, and at every window, on the plantation" (57). Notably, 
he successfully induces in the slaves a kind of paranoia similar to the disciplinary 
subject's sense of being under the ubiquitous gaze in Jeremy Bentham's 
Panopticon: "He had the faculty of making us feel that he was always present" 
(570). Douglass's account suggests, then, that in African-American history, there 
is an overlap in the two deployments of power: Covey's strategy partakes in 
both spectacle and panopticism. 
We must note, however, that, although slaves seem to be uncertain whether 
or not they are being watched over by their master, his gaze nevertheless fails to 
become properly panoptic. The slaves, for example, manage to exchange 
mutinous words among themselves. As Douglass recalls, he and other slaves 
"never called [Covey] by any other name than 'the snake.' We fancied that in 
his eyes and gait we could see a snakish resemblance." For the servants, Covey's 
"trickery" is a decidedly "unmanly" practice (265, 266). Clearly, Douglass is 
able to cast a gaze of contempt upon the master's strategies and distance himself 
from the scene of surveillance. 
According to Foucault, the staging of state-sanctioned violence in the 
seventeenth century invited repercussions by which those wielding the power 
were themselves threatened. Public execution, he writes, "was. . . dangerous, in 
that it provided a support for a confrontation between the violence of the king 
and the violence of the people. It was as if the sovereign power did not see, in 
this emulation of atrocity, a challenge that it itself threw down and which might 
one day be taken up" (73). This challenge, of course, is what Douglass's narrator 
responds to in his counter-violence and resistance to Covey. After several vicious 
beatings, he decides rather to fight his master to death than to succumb to another 
flogging. It is here that the power balance between the two men changes: "This 
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battle with Mr. Covey was the turning-point in my career as a slave. It rekindled 
the few expiring embers of freedom, and revived within me a sense of my own 
manhood" (65). What Covey experiences is the kind of reversal of violence 
which, according to Foucault, was the reason behind the eighteenth-century shift 
to discipline. Writing in the late nineteenth century, Douglass himself predicts 
such reversals as the outcome of the terroristic attempts at black disfranchisement: 
"In arguing upon what will be the action of the Negro in case he continues to be 
the victim of lynch law I accept the statement often made in his disparagement, 
that he is an imitative being; that he will do what he sees other men do."35 The 
young Douglass's resistance, then, was part of the costly consequences of slave 
system's sovereign violence that W. E. B. Du Bois sardonically identifies as one 
of the driving forces behind abolition: "It was seen, first in England and later in 
other countries, that slavery as an industrial system could not be made to work 
satisfactorily in modern times. Its cost was too great, and one of the causes of 
this cost was the slave insurrections from the very beginning, when the slaves 
rose of the plantation of Diego Columbus down to the Civil War in America."36 
In Black Boy, Wright illustrates the way in which such problems were 
resolved in the twentieth century. Indeed, scenes of uprising or rebellion are 
missing from his autobiography. Instead, he suggests over and again that, for a 
racially marked subject, a crucial survival skill in the South is the ability to read 
race and to show that s/he is literate in matters of race: to show by demeanor 
that one knows one's place. The fact that the narrator proves to be less than 
agile in learning the significance of color leads him to several confrontations 
with his environment. Among these, there are scenes which vary from the violence 
exhibited by white people (see, for example, 172-75) to other, seemingly less 
injurious moments of guidance by his fellow blacks. Here, I want to concentrate 
on an example of the latter that takes place as one of the narrator's well-meaning 
friends, a young man called Griggs, instructs him in the importance in learning 
to see color in one's environment and, further, in controlling what one lets white 
people see. Griggs, whom the narrator meets washing his employer's windows, 
scolds the narrator for his inappropriate behavior: "'See?' he said triumphantly, 
pointing his finger at me. 'There it is, now\ It's in your face 'He paused and 
looked about; the streets were filled with white people. He spoke to me in a low, 
full tone. 'Dick, look, you're black, black, black, see? Can't you understand 
that?'" (176). Drawing attention to Dick's failure to "look" properly—to see 
and to show that he is "black, black, black"—the friend exhorts him to pay 
attention to the color of the people around them, to learn to see the racial 
markedness of his environment: '"You act around white people as if you didn't 
know that they were white. And they see it.'" Griggs has to spell out for Dick 
the disastrous consequences that being color blind can have: '"White people 
make it their business to watch niggers,'" he explains. '"And they pass the word 
around.... You're marked already'" (176). 
To Griggs's advice that he should be careful not to '"act around white people 
as if he didn't know they were white,'" the narrator remarks, '"Oh, Christ, I 
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can't be a slave'" (177). For the narrator, acting according to the code proposed 
by Griggs is tantamount to being enslaved. Yet, acceding to such slavery may be 
required for survival: 
"But you've got to eat," [Griggs] said. 
"Yes, I've got to eat." 
"Then start acting like it," he hammered at me, pounding his 
fist in his palm. "When you're in front of white people, think 
before you act, think before you speak. . ." (177). 
The narrator is faced with a choice—whether or not to become literate in the 
racial code of the South—that is, precisely, an overdetermined and, hence, an 
impossible choice because at stake is his existence: "I fought with myself, telling 
myself that I had to master this thing, that my life depended upon it" (186). If he 
would not conform to the code, he would not make a living and would possibly 
be killed. Here, the narrator encounters the power and lure of subjection. Judith 
Butler argues that one of the ways in which power induces subjection is by 
promising continued existence as its corollary: "within subjection the price of 
existence is subordination. Precisely at the moment in which choice is impossible, 
the subject pursues subordination as the promise of existence. . . . Subjection 
exploits the desire for existence."37 However, while Wright's narrator is promised 
continued existence were he to conform to the Southern, racialized code of 
conduct (he would be employed and not immediately be threatened with 
violence), subjection would condemn the racialized subject to a kind of 
immobility, a living death. While this condition is related to what Orlando 
Patterson has called the slaves' "social death," the immobility it induces differs 
from slavery's "profound natal alienation" or exclusion38 in naming a kind of a 
terroristic suture into and by the optical trade. 
For the narrator, however, it seems impossible to embody this role perfectly: 
What Griggs was saying was true, but it was simply utterly 
impossible for me to calculate, to scheme, to act, to plot all 
the time. I would remember to dissemble for short periods, 
then I would forget and act straight and human again, not with 
the desire to harm anybody, but merely forgetting the artificial 
status of race and class (177).39 
Acting properly requires an ability "to calculate, to scheme"—to adhere to the 
rules of a certain economy. These rules remain baffling and unreadable for the 
narrator. However, Griggs knows of a job opening in the vicinity and, having 
instructed the narrator, informs him: "There's an optical company upstairs and 
the boss is a Yankee from Illinois.... He wants to break a colored boy into the 
optical trade'" (111-IS; emphases added). The narrator is given, in other words, 
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another chance to learn "the optical trade," the economy of the visible. Here, the 
exigencies of capitalist economy form the background of, or at least are ever-
present in, the maintenance of social hierarchies based on race as the 
commonsensical criterion of visibility. Learning to see the right way is potentially 
a "trade" for the narrator, just as "watch[ing] niggers" is made, as Griggs puts it, 
by "white people" into "their business."40 
We must read the verb "to break (in)" in its double meaning in the phrase 
"to break a colored boy into the optical trade." It signifies an act not only of 
introduction but also of a violent, forceful subjugation. "Colored boys" like the 
narrator have to be broken by breaking them into the optical trade, that is, by 
teaching them the appropriate way of seeing and being seen, of performing and 
gazing.41 The phrase gains its full significance when placed in the historical 
context of slavery and Douglass's Narrative. As the narrator's anguished words, 
"I can't be a slave," suggest, "breaking (in)" connotes also the process of 
"breaking (in) slaves," teaching them their roles and duties by crushing their 
will with floggings and beatings, a practice in which Covey and such fictional 
counterparts as Simon Legree excel. Having listened to Griggs's instructions on 
how to act among white people, the narrator of Black Boy says, "T guess you're 
right.. . . I've got to watch myself, break myself. . .'" (177; second ellipsis in 
the original). As the shift from Griggs's "breaking into" to the narrator's "breaking 
oneself demonstrates, the professionalization of colored boys in and by the 
optical trade entails violence, which may be most efficacious when self-inflicted. 
Wright's autobiographical narrator would have us believe that his failure in 
breaking himself resulted more from a hapless, unwitting non-conformity than 
from conscious rebellion: 
Perhaps I had waited too long to start working for white people; 
perhaps I should have begun earlier, when I was younger—as 
most of the other black boys had done—and perhaps by now 
the tension would have become an habitual condition, 
contained and controlled by reflex. But that was not to be my 
lot; I was always to be conscious of it, brood over it, carry it 
in my heart, live with it, sleep with it, fight with it (143). 
Consequently, his is a particularly "'tough break,'" as Griggs observes (183). 
In the transition from Douglass to Wright, then, the surveillance and slave-
breaking by the master is turned into self-surveillance and s elf-breaking. As his 
later writings clearly show, Douglass was aware of such mutations in the racist 
procedures of post-Reconstruction America. While writing in 1894 he points to 
peonage, disfranchisement, and the "mobocratic crimes" of lynching as 
bespeaking "the determination of slavery to perpetuate itself, if not under one 
form, then under another,"421 suggest that Wright, in Black Boy, observes how 
slavery had further metamorphosed into practices of self-breaking. In early-
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twentieth century America, in other words, the racial logic that sustained slavery 
was not only inscribed into the penal code (as Angela Davis notes) and morphed 
into the practices of disfranchisement and lynching (as Douglass argues), but 
also internalized as the injunctions of the optical trade, where the demand for 
surveillance is posited upon the subject him/herself, hence not allowing any 
emancipatory synthesis of the Master-S lave dialectic. 
Heavenly Massa 
A number of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century African-American 
narratives suggest that, despite its counterdiscursive potential, religious activity 
aided in this transition from "sovereign terror" to more productive ways of 
panoptic discipline. In this context, Kojeve's reading of the anaesthetizing 
ideologies of slavery—stoicism, solipsism, and Christianity—resonates with a 
Foucauldian understanding of the economies of power and visibility. According 
to Kojève, as the slave tries to come to terms with his situation and to "reconcile 
the ideal of Freedom with the fact of Slavery," he proceeds from an attitude of 
stoicism—where he tells himself that his Freedom is guaranteed by his inner 
conviction that he is free—to one of solipsism—where he convinces himself 
that outside conditions such as slavery do not matter because only inner 
experience is real—and, finally, to the "ideology" of Christianity.43 Having thus 
secured the otherworldly recognition by God and freedom in the beyond, the 
slave does not need to enter into a new life-and-death combat with the master. 
Kojève's reading of the Christian slave is harsh: "He is a slave without a Master, 
he is a Slave in himself, he is the pure essence of slavery."44 
Cornel West, perhaps the most prominent of contemporary commentators 
on the "Christian prophetic tradition" in African-American life, points to the 
one-sidedness of such a view of the black Christian tradition: "the black Christian 
tragic sense of life," he writes, "focuses on resistance and opposition in the here 
and now against overwhelming odds."45 Religious activity has provided openings 
for other forms of intervention too, allowing, for example, African-American 
women "to articulate a public discourse critical of women's subordination."46 
Despite such reminders, we should nevertheless recognize the thoroughly 
ambivalent role of religion in African-American texts. Not only do they point 
out, as Pauline Hopkins does, that slavery "was sanctioned by almost the whole 
religious world of the United States";47 more subtly, they suggest that spirituality, 
like everything else, is an inherently double-edged tool whose potential for 
dismantling the master's mansion is never clearly separated from its ability for 
neat housekeeping. For such tools to have any leverage in reconstructive 
strategies, one must carefully advertise their inescapable, concomitant dangers, 
for "the bondsman (servant) is all the more the servant, the more he (mis)perceives 
his position as that of an autonomous agent."48 
Of course, whether we note the insurrectionary leverage of black churches 
in African-American history49 or point out their quietist tendencies—as Wright 
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often does—to assign one meaning to them is to engage in generalizations. As 
Milton Sernett observes, "Interpreting all African American religion as political 
radicalism is as much a distortion of the whole as is dismissing the black churches 
as universally escapist, otherworldly, and politically dysfunctional."50 Du Bois, 
for one, recognized such complexity: while being "distinctly critical" of 
"organized religion," he does note the emancipatory potential in the church 
which "work[s] for human salvation this side of eternity, and . . . admit[s] the 
possibility of vast betterment here and now."51 While Wright often rejects religion 
as a source of resistance, in the early short story "Big Boy Leaves Home" he too 
points to the multiple meanings that can be assigned to religious activity in 
black communities. When the protagonist has killed a white man in self-defense, 
his mother tells him, "'Nobody but the good Lawd kin hep us now. '"52 However, 
the mother's otherworldly appeal is quickly actualized by communal activity as 
the members of the congregation help Big Boy to escape. A further detail, 
however, suggests that they take action merely to wash their hands off the 
transgressor for fear of white retaliation. One of the elders, for example, refuses 
to let Big Boy find refuge in the church because '"ef they ketch im there itll ruin 
us all. We gotta git the boy outta town . . ,'"53 
While Wright observes that black "churches are social organisations rather 
than bands of faithful believers"54 whose possible political impact remains "an 
open question,"55 overall he is unconvinced of their efficacy: "The activities of 
the church ... have never brought about a favorable change."56 Indeed, African-
American spirituality appears in his work mostly as a self-defeating practice of 
docility and self-surveillance. Both Native Son and "The Man Who Lived 
Underground" contain scenes where the fugitive protagonists gaze upon a black 
congregation. While Bigger listens to the pathetic songs "of surrender, of 
resignation" as he hides out in a derelict building,57 the unnamed protagonist of 
the short story is appalled and repulsed by a group of black worshippers: "They 
oughtn't to do that, he thought.... He felt that he was gazing upon something 
abysmally obscene. . . . A vague conviction made him feel that those people 
should stand unrepentant and yield no quarter in singing and praying."58 When 
his lawyer asks Bigger if he wished to be religious if that guaranteed some 
degree of happiness for him, he answers, "'Naw. I'll be dead soon enough. If I 
was religious I'd be dead now.'"59 Elsewhere in Native Son, Christian faith is 
not only compared to intoxication ("What [Bigger's] mother had was Bessie's 
whiskey, and Bessie's whiskey was his mother's religion"),60 but equated with 
racist Klan practices when the cross Reverend Hammond gives for Bigger to 
wear in jail is doubled in the burning cross of the KKK.61 Having witnessed 
these scenes, Bigger tells Max, "'The white folks like for us to be religious, then 
they can do what they want with us.'"62 Similarly, even as the young Richard in 
Black Boy is drawn to the "vivid language of the sermons," the "sensual caress" 
of hymns, and "the dramatic vision of life held by the church" (98, 107), he 
nevertheless comes to see in organized religion "the attempt of one individual 
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or group to rule another in the name of God. The naked will to power seemed 
always to walk in the wake of a hymn" (130). Wright echoes these observations 
in Black Power, where he argues that the Ghanaians have become "more docile" 
with their acceptance of Christianity.63 In commenting on Africa and its colonial 
history, he ironically notes that "Heavens had a color line and that was why 
white men, staunch Christians, reflected so much racial bias in their daily dealing 
with their fellow blacks. . . .',64 Elsewhere Wright ponders, "to what degree is 
religion in America officially and ideologically identified with the policy of 
White Supremacy?"65 
Wright's ambivalence about black religion is shared by earlier African-
American authors. In Pauline Hopkins's Hagar s Daughter (1901/1902), a slave 
buyer observes the advantages of having religious slaves: when one of the 
marketed slaves informs him of his religious convictions, the white man responds: 
"'Got religion, have you? So much the better. I like to deal in the gospel.'"66 
Similarly, a slave auctioneer in Martin R. Delany's Blake notes to prospective 
purchasers of the item for sale that "'the Negro fellow is religious; by the by, an 
excellent recommendation, gentlemen.'"67 Religious slaves suit slave owners, 
who can "deal in gospel" as much as they deal in slaves. In his Narrative, 
Douglass too sees these two economies as mutually supportive: "Revivals of 
religion and revivals in the slave-trade go hand in hand together. The slave 
prison and the church stand near each other" (98).68 "Were I to be again reduced 
to the chains of slavery," he writes earlier, "next to that enslavement, I should 
regard being the slave of a religious master the greatest calamity that could 
befall me. For of all slaveholders with whom I have ever met, religious 
slaveholders are the worst" (68).69 While Douglass attacks the brutality sanctioned 
by white Christianity, Reverend Pinchen of Hagar s Daughter—whom we can 
see as one of the "reverend slave-driver[s]" that raise Douglass's ire (70)— 
importantly suggests other ways in which religion proves productive for slave 
owners: 
"a man in your business of buying and selling slaves needs 
religion more than anybody else, for it makes you treat your 
people well. Now there's Mr. Haskins—he's a slave-trader 
like yourself. . . . Before I converted him he would sell 
husbands from their wives and delight in doing it; but now he 
won't sell a man from his wife if he can get anyone to buy 
them together. I tell you, religion has done a wonderful work 
for him."70 
Unlike in Douglass's Narrative, where slave owners quote Scripture to justify 
debilitating beatings (53), religious discipline here does "wonderful work" for 
slave traders by curbing the most excessive forms of the master's enjoyment— 
what Jacques Lacan would call their obscene jouissance—that might otherwise 
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impede the smooth flowing of (the symbolic) economy and the maximizing of 
profits.71 Having become religious, the white man does not allow his personal 
enjoyment, as disruptive jouissance, to stand in the way of good business—but 
neither do religious sentiments prohibit him from breaking up families if it makes 
good economic sense. Slavery's commerce is aided by what Wright's 
autobiographical narrator calls "[t]his business of saving souls" (147). 
Also elsewhere, religion emerges as a disciplinary method with which slaves 
are more or less effectively sutured into their places without the necessity of 
overt violence. In her narrative of 1861, Harriet Jacobs recounts how, after Nat 
Turner's rebellion, plantation owners decided to educate their slaves in religion 
so as "to keep them from murdering their masters."72 Whereas Douglass's master 
sends him to Covey after the uprising of 1831, Jacobs's masters resort to religious 
education as a way of taming their slaves. In Douglass's and Jacobs's narratives, 
then, religion and "nigger-breaking" emerge as related practices responding to 
the eruption of slave violence. In Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, a white 
preacher reproaches the slaves for being "eye-servants": "'Instead of serving 
your masters faithfully, which is pleasing in the sight of your heavenly Master, 
you are idle, and shirk your work. God sees you. You tell lies. God hears 
you. . . . Your masters may not find you out, but God sees you, and will punish 
you.'"73 The speech, replete with emphases on the all-seeing "heavenly Master,"74 
ends with an admonishment for slaves to make themselves more visible to their 
masters: " ' . . . When you go from here, don't stop at the corners of the streets to 
talk, but go directly home, and let your master and mistresses see that you have 
come.'"75 Nat Turner's traumatic uprising in August 183176 revealed the slave 
owners' management of property as insufficient in that it allowed for such 
unforeseeable events as the slaughter of up to sixty-five whites in the hands of 
Turner's rebels. What was needed was a more finely tuned system of 
surveillance—a system that would make it impossible for slaves to deploy masks, 
to be "eye-servants," to massacre their masters.77 
Similar concerns are voiced by the slave owners in William Wells Brown's 
Clotel; or, The President s Daughter (1853). Repeating the Reverend's call in 
Jacobs's narrative, Snyder, a white preacher, counsels his black congregation, 
"'You are not to be eye-servants. Now, eye-servants are such as will work hard, 
and seem mighty diligent, while they think anybody is taking notice of them; 
but, when their masters' and mistresses' backs are turned they are idle, and 
neglect their business.'" Snyder reminds the slaves that, even if they can 
conceivably deceive their masters and mistresses, they cannot deceive God, in 
whose scheme they have been given their natural places as white people's 
servants.78 Snyder's speech is held up in Clotel as an example of treacherous, 
disingenuous forms of Christianity. Its two white listeners, the Northerner Mr. 
Carlton and the Southern slave owner's daughter, who has been educated in the 
liberal North, remain abolitionists and see through the pretense. Having married 
and inherited the plantation from Mrs. Carlton's father, they institute a new 
work environment for the slaves, based on, as it were, compassionate Christianity. 
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Mr. and Mrs. Carlton decide to put into effect a "gradual emancipation" of their 
slaves: the cruel overseer is dismissed, no physical punishment is to be allowed, 
and the former slaves are to be credited for their work. The text celebrates the 
consequent, productive change in the work ethics of the ex-slaves: 
A sedateness, a care, an economy, an industry, took possession 
of them, to which there seemed to be no bounds but in their 
physical strength. They were never tired of labouring, and 
seemed as though they could never effect enough. They 
became more temperate, moral, religious, setting an example 
of innocent, unoffending lives to the world around them, which 
was seen and admired by all.79 
The owner of the neighboring plantation comes to the site of the tireless slaves 
to wonder at the industry and faithfulness of the negroes. Having been frustrated 
in his eager offers to purchase the negroes as slaves, he asks Mr. Carlton: 
"pray tell me what it is that makes your negroes work so? . . . 
I have never seen such people; building as they are next door 
to my residence. I see and have my eye on them from morning 
till night. You are never there, for I have never met you, or 
seen you once at the building. Why, sir, I am an early riser, 
getting up before day; and do you think that I am not awoke 
every morning in my life by the noise of their trowels at work, 
and their singing and noise before day; and do you suppose, 
sir, that they stop or leave off work at sundown? No, sir, but 
they work as long as they can see to lay a brick, and then they 
carry up brick and mortar for an hour or two afterward, to be 
ahead of their work the next morning. And again, sir, do you 
think that they walk at their work? No, sir, they run all day. 
You see, sir, those immensely long ladders, five stories in 
height; do you suppose they walk up them? No, sir, they run 
up and down them like so many monkeys all day long. I never 
saw such people as these in my life. I don't know what to 
make of them. Were a white man with them and over them 
with a whip, then I should see and understand the cause of the 
running and incessant labour; but I cannot comprehend it; there 
is something in it, sir. Great man, sir, that Jim; great man; I 
should like to own him."80 
To the visitor's amazement, such industry and diligence is achieved without 
the presence of the master's gaze. As much as the text offers the Carltons as 
examples of pious white people who treat blacks justly and humanely, what one 
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arguably encounters here is the shift from a regime of physical punishment to 
one of internalized super-vision that renders (ex-)slaves their own overseers. 
Even as they are freed from their immediate bondage, a new "economy," as the 
text itself suggests, "[takes] possession of them."81 The price of freedom, Clotel 
suggests—perhaps inadvertently—is tokenism and panoptic subjection: as the 
maternal Mrs. Carlton tells her freed servants in a subsequent scene, "'From 
this hour . . . you are free, and all eyes will be fixed upon you.'"82 Freedom can 
be bought only at the price of the implantation of the white gaze. Recalling the 
failure of Reconstruction, we can suggest that it may be impossible to render an 
economy that was based on slavery beneficial or salubrious to those who were 
slaves under it through changes and modifications based on individual volition. 
A radical refiguring is needed by those whose subjugation/subjection has been 
(and remains) an integral part of the economy. 
Lynching and the Optical Trade 
Considering the brutality of lynching practices, which survived well into 
the twentieth century and the era that Wright describes in Black Boy, it would be 
obscene to argue for a clear break between the modes of spectacle and discipline 
in the U.S. racial economy.83 If disciplinary and panoptic strategies are embedded 
in slavery,84 the threat of violence is an integral component of the optical trade. 
Observing the changes in racial relations in 1920s, Zangrando writes: "With 
blacks largely disfranchised, segregated, and economically victimized, 
supremacists could dispense with lynching as an everyday means of manipulation 
and control. Blacks, however, could never be certain that violence might not 
recur."85 In Black Boy, Wright suggests the regularity of physical violence in the 
optical trade by prefacing the scene of Griggs's instruction with examples of 
white brutality against blacks (two white men assault a black woman, who is 
consequently arrested for disorderly conduct; the narrator is assailed by a gang 
of white youths [172-75]). 
But above all, in order to learn the optical trade and to act according to its 
dictates, black boys have to "watch themselves." "'[WJatch yourself and don't 
get into trouble,'" a white man tells the narrator (181). In Du Boisian terms, he 
has to learn to utilize "double-consciousness," seeing himself through the eyes 
of others, if he wants to escape becoming a target for violence. In this double-
consciousness resides the violence of the visible that sutures the racialized subject 
into his/her place much more securely than the spectacle of the punishment, 
however gruesome and traumatic, that Douglass's young narrator witnesses. 
Adopting the terminology of trauma studies, we can say that, in the hundred 
years that separate the two African-American writers, the visible trauma of 
subjugation in slavery is taken over by the insidious trauma of everyday racism.86 
However, even though, time and again, the narrator finds himself "resolving 
to watch [his] every move" (186), he cannot accommodate himself to such 
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double-consciousness but always forgets his place in the optical trade. In working 
for the optical company, he learns that to occupy his position in the trade is, in 
a certain sense, to attempt the impossible. The owner of the company tells his 
two other employees, white men called Pease and Reynolds, "to break [the 
narrator] in gradually to the workings of the shop" (179; emphasis added). While 
Pease and Reynolds seem to agree, the narrator finds himself sweeping the floors 
and doing other menial tasks, rather than learning to operate the machines with 
which lenses are ground and polished. When he asks one of the men to guide 
him in the work so that he could "learn the trade," he gets a hostile response: 
"Nigger, you think you're white, don't you?" 
"No, sir." 
"You're acting mighty like it," he said. 
Pease shook his fist in my face. 
"This is a white man's work around here," he said (180). 
Finally, the narrator realizes, "I was black; I lived in the South. I would never 
learn to operate those machines as long as those two men in there stood by 
them" (184). 
As a result of the incident, Pease and Reynolds apparently decide to teach 
the narrator a lesson. He is confronted by the white men, with Reynolds saying 
that he heard him refer to his colleague as Pease. This puts the narrator into an 
unnegotiable double bind. Had he, a black boy, called a white man anything but 
Mister or Sir, he would be beaten. Were he to deny the accusations, he would 
accuse another white man of lying, and would consequently be beaten. In the 
optical trade, the narrator is positioned in an impossible site where he can make 
no right move, where violence is inevitable; in Jay Mechlin's folkloric terms, he 
finds himself faced with a situation of "paradoxical communications" that he 
cannot negotiate.87 Disoriented, he feels "that the people were unreal,... that I 
had been slapped out of the human race" (182), and resolves to resign from the 
company. The next day, as he returns to get his final pay check, the Yankee boss 
tries to find out what has happened. "An impulse to speak rose in me and died 
with the realization that I was facing a wall that I would never breech [sic]. I 
tried to speak several times and could make no sounds" (183). Finally, the narrator 
leaves the optical company, without saying a word to the boss, "[going] into the 
sunshine and walk[ing] home like a blind man" (185). 
The confrontation with Pease and Reynolds reminds the narrator of a 
lynching of an acquaintance he has heard of. To understand the exact position 
of black boys in the optical trade, let us consider this scene: 
What I had heard [of the lynching] altered the look of the 
world, induced in me a temporary paralysis of will and 
impulse. The penalty of death awaited me if I made a false 
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move and I wondered if it was worth-while to make any move 
at all. The things that influenced my conduct as a Negro did 
not have to happen to me directly; I needed but to hear of 
them to feel their full effects in the deepest layers of my 
consciousness. Indeed, the white brutality that I had not seen 
was a more effective control of my behavior than that which I 
knew. The actual experience would have let me see the realistic 
outlines of what was really happening, but as long as it 
remained something terrible and yet remote, something whose 
horror and blood might descend upon me at any moment, I 
was compelled to give my entire imagination over to it, an act 
which blocked the springs of thought and feeling in me, 
creating a sense of distance between me and the world in which 
I lived (164-65). 
Hearing of the lynching does something to "the look of the world"—to the 
narrator's vision of the world and/or the way he feels he is being looked at—and 
an immobility, "a temporary paralysis," ensues. The narrator wonders whether 
he should move at all, or just stay where he is, in his place. This paralysis is 
repeated as he tries to form a response to Pease and Reynolds: "my tongue 
would not move. . . . I tried to speak several times and could make no sounds" 
(182, 183). For such paralysis to be induced, it is not necessary for the racial 
subject to experience a lynching or even witness one—indeed, it seems that the 
threat of violence works better when it is not experienced first-hand but remains 
at a remove. Were the narrator to experience the act of violence himself, he 
might be able to deduce some logic in the way in which it is meted out, to 
predict its course and recurrence. Now that it remains to a degree invisible, its 
logic is similarly cloaked, veiled, and becomes more threatening because 
unpredictable: the narrator, like the colonized subject whom Frantz Fanon 
describes in The Wretched of the Earth, "is never sure whether or not he has 
crossed the frontier."88 As Richard later muses, "perhaps even a kick was better 
than uncertainty" (253). 
Yet, a small opening in the economy of subjection is suggested when, later 
in Black Boy, the crucial term "the look of the world" is repeated to describe the 
effects of reading. The narrator tells how, in his effort to leave the South, he 
"hungered for books, new ways of looking and seeing. It was not a matter of 
believing or disbelieving what [he] read, but of feeling something new, of being 
affected by something that made the look of the world different" (23 8).89 Reading, 
like lynching, does something to the narrator's perception: "the mood of the 
book" he read would "linger, coloring everything [he] saw, heard, did" (238). 
The narrator's first experience of reading—when the grandmother's lodger reads 
Bluebeard and His Seven Wives to Richard—affects him similarly: "the look of 
things altered" (38). Through the literary, the narrator is able to address issues 
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of visibility in new ways. As Robert Stepto observes, "Wright reminds us that 
reading . . . depends on seeing and knowing and gaining perspective."90 The 
paralyzing, immobilizing "the look of the world," induced by the news of the 
lynching, is renegotiated through the experience of the literary, which resituates 
the narrator and others in the field of vision. Through reading, the narrator 
"beg[ins] to regard [the people around him] differently" (238). 
But more immediately, Wright's commentary on slave-breaking lays bare 
the shift in racialized violence where the black body has disappeared as the 
primary target and where the agent of the violence has been internalized by the 
racially marked subject. The comparison between Douglass and Wright suggests 
that, in the system of subjection that the latter describes, the violence of the 
visible functions more efficiently to imprison racially marked subjects in their 
"places" than the overt violence—breaking and lynching—depicted by 
Douglass.91 Concomitant to this shift is the move from the most brutal practices 
of lynching to what some commentators have called "legal lynchings." Writing 
in 1894, Douglass wanted the crimes that were imputed to blacks to be dealt 
with "in open court and in open daylight" rather than by "mobocrats."92 Yet, in 
staging Bigger Thomas's trial, Wright suggests that, in the twentieth century, 
mob violence finds an expression in the very court on whose legitimacy Douglass 
had relied.93 
Hence, even though one is tempted to laud the diminishing aspect of sheer 
violence in the transition from Douglass's time to Wright's, one has to heed 
Foucault's advocacy for resistance in the face of any commonsensical conclusions 
as to the reasons behind the transition from a society of punishment to one of 
surveillance. According to him, the disappearance of the spectacle of physical 
torture in juridical systems of the West has been "attributed too readily and too 
emphatically to a process of 'humanization,' thus dispensing with the need for 
further analysis" (7). A more attuned exploration, he writes, would try to uncover 
the processes whereby the new disciplinary strategies could penetrate and 
determine the subjects' consciousness in "economical" and productive ways 
unrivaled by the strategies of the spectacle. "What was emerging," he concludes, 
"no doubt was not so much a new respect for the humanity of the condemned 
. . . as a tendency towards a more finely tuned justice, towards a closer penal 
mapping of the social body" (78). The aim was "to set up a new 'economy' of 
the power to punish, to assure its better distribution, . . . so that it should be 
distributed in homogenous circuits capable of operating everywhere, in a 
continuous way, down to the finest grain of the social body" (80).94 
Making her argument with considerably broader material than I do in this 
essay, Hartman observes subjection's tightening grip on the post-Reconstruction 
African-American subject: "It was often the case that benevolent correctives 
and declarations of slave humanity intensified the brutal exercise of power upon 
the captive body rather than ameliorating the chattel condition." For the racially 
marked subject of the late nineteenth century, "emancipation appears less the 
The Optical Trade 109 
grand event of liberation than a point of transition between modes of servitude 
and racial subjection."95 Indeed, in the nineteenth-century narratives I have been 
discussing here, self-surveillance and violence of the visible prove to be much 
more effective deployments of power than the threat and execution of corporal 
punishment. Self-breaking emerges as the logical conclusion to the practices of 
lesser corporeal violence. As Henry Blake recognizes, benign masters confound 
if not pre-empt the slaves' drive for freedom: ""Tis this confounded 'good 
treatment' and expectation of getting freed by their oppressors, that has been 
the curse of the slave. . . . A 'good master' is the very worst of masters.'"96 We 
can similarly contrast the endless, self-imposed toil of the servants at the Carlton 
plantation in Clotel to Douglass's observation that "There was no earthly 
inducement in the slave's condition to incite him to labor faithfully. The fear of 
punishment was the sole motive of any sort of industry with him" (570). 
Unsurprisingly, such observations find echoes in theories of colonialism. Peter 
Hulme, for example, writes that "[t]he problem with slavery is that slaves are 
dangerous because forced to labour against their will; the danger is removed if 
their 'enslavement' is voluntary and therefore not slavery at all."97 Fanon, too, 
notes that, in the course of occupation, "the more brutal manifestations of the 
presence of the occupying power may perfectly well disappear. Indeed, such a 
spectacular disappearance turns out to be both a saving of expense to the colonial 
power and a positive way of preventing its forces being spread out over a wide 
area." "But such a disappearance will be paid for at a high price: the price of a 
much stricter control of the country's future destiny."98 Again, it is economic 
utility that dictates the shift from colonial brutality to what Gramsci would call 
hegemony: such a turn proves "a saving of expense" for colonizers and leads to 
"a servitude that is less blatant but much more complete."99 For Lewis Gordon, 
the colonizer's "call for a nonviolent solution amounts to the preservation of 
colonialism, or at least a transformation of colonialism into a condition that he 
will prefer, which amounts to a form of neocolonialism."100 
Wright suggests that the function of lynching has been taken over, but not 
entirely displaced, by the disciplinary practices of self-breaking. Moving from 
post-Reconstruction to early-twentieth-century America, there occurred "an 
optical trade" in the strategies of subjection whereby overtly violent practices 
were subsumed into more subtle yet economical strategies of self-production; 
lynching and breaking, in other words, were partially displaced by the disciplinary 
tactics of subjection. This, as I have emphasized above, does not mean that 
lynching as a deadly and racially driven practice has entirely disappeared. (Here, 
we may think of Jasper, Texas.)101 Understanding the more subtle functioning of 
lynching and breaking in twentieth-century America nevertheless allows us to 
point outpace Foucault, the shifting circuits of power. The optical trade, relying 
on the systematic deployment of what Fanon calls "epidermalized differences,"102 
is an apparatus of subjection whose functioning is arguably more uninterrupted 
and economical because it has made the racialized subject, to paraphrase and 
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recontextualize Thoreau, into his or her own slave-driver. If a Hegelian reading 
sees in the Douglass-Covey confrontation the "dialectical overcoming" of 
slavery—or at least a promise thereof—Wright, in revising the optimism that 
Douglass's "career as a slave" may give rise to, suggests that the racialized 
subject in the post-Reconstruction era may have come dangerously close to 
what Kojève, after Hegel, calls "the pure essence of slavery."103 
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